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‘Coercive Cooperation’ in Action:
Explaining South Korea’s Non-proliferation Financing Regime*1
Hyun Koo Cho
Inducing cooperation from hesitant members in a sanctioning coalition is critical for effective 
implementation of a financial sanction. Strategic cooperation among states with divergent interests 
involves time inconsistency and incomplete information, however. A ‘coercive cooperation’ approach 
addresses this problem either by imposing ex post costs through higher audience costs or offering ex 
ante benefits through tactical issue linkage. This paper applies a Bayesian equilibrium model to address 
the sequencing of these two main factors that contribute to ‘coercive cooperation’. Unlike in games 
with complete information, our model explains why the sender state not only resorts to international 
institutions but also employs unilateral countersanctions to enforce compliance in a sanctioning 
coalition. It is shown that international organizations offer ex ante benefits through issue-linkage 
while the sender state imposes ex post costs with a threat of countersanctions. When the follower state 
perceives the benefits to be greater than the costs, it has strong incentives to join the coalition with no 
substantive change in implementing measures. Once in a bandwagon, however, the sender can bring 
about active implementation by imposing audience costs on himself and the follower. The predictions 
from the model have been supported by the case study on South Korea’s non-proliferation financing 
regime.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness of economic sanctions, including the so-called targeted sanctions, 
has been the enduring topic of scholarly debate on the subject (Rogers, 1996; Pape, 1997; 
Baldwin, 1999; Elliott, 2002; Drezner, 2015). The extant literature highlights specific 
conditions for a successful sanction such as the substantial damage on the target (Drezner, 
1997), the dispute’s low salience (Morgan and Schwebach, 1997), the democratic nature 
of the target state and anticipation of no future conflicts (Allen, 2005; Drezner, 2000), the 
involvement of international institutions (Bapat and Morgan, 2009), the market share of the 
sender’s firms in the target (Bapat and Kwon, 2015), and shows a higher success rate at the 
threat stage than at the imposition stage (Nooruddin, 2002). These findings cast doubts on 
the existing sanction’s effectiveness on ‘big cases’ like Iran and North Korea since they point 
out “the key to making sanctions work is to threaten allied democracies on small matters of 
import” (Drezner, 2011: 99). Further, on the important topic of the target’s damage, Iraq’s 
humanitarian crisis following one of the most comprehensive UN sanction in the 1990s 
led many policymakers and scholars to look into who are most affected by sanctions inside 
the target state (Kaempfer, Lowenberg and Mertens, 2004). More often than not, suffering 
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was inflicted on the vulnerable and the powerless, especially on women with the minimum 
impact on the core regime supporters (Buck, Gallant and Nossal, 1998). This recognition 
led to the targeted ‘smart sanction’ – financial sanctions, travel bans, restrictions on luxury 
good, and arms embargoes. Financial sanctions “consist of asset freezes, limited or total 
bans from the international financial system, and sanctions on banks that facilitate terrorist 
or proliferation-related transactions” and aim to “cut the financial lifeline supporting the 
targeted group or regime and their illicit activities” (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2012: 243). Despite 
the ongoing controversies over the conditions for a successful sanction, Baldwin (1999: 
81) argues for distinguishing whether sanctions work from whether they should be used in 
light of the relative cost and benefit of a particular sanction compared with other options of 
influence. Granted that this distinction is valid and important, the relative merit of financial 
sanctions vis-a-vis trade sanctions or other variants of targeted sanctions has been amply 
noted by researchers and practitioners alike (Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff, 1997; 
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 2007; Passas, 2011; Zarate, 2013). According to its supporters, 
financial sanctions differ from others in that they are targeted with limited collateral damage 
while imposing significant costs on target economies (Ekert, 2008; Loeffler, 2009; Zarate, 
2013). Due to the U.S. pre-eminence in global financial markets and the U.S. dollar’s role 
in international transactions, there is less incentive to “defect from the sanctions regime” 
(Drezner, 2015: 758).
However, as financial sanction has gained momentum in economic statecraft, more recent 
scholarship has noted its shortcomings in galvanizing support from the banking sector and 
other national governments in the implementation phase, especially with respect to financial 
sanctions against WMD proliferation (Ouagrham-Gourmley, 2012; Ganguli and Ernoult, 
2012; Arnold, 2016). Ouagrham-Gourmley (2012), based on interviews with bank and 
government representatives, argues that a traditional focus on the impact of sanctions on the 
receiving end neglected the shortcomings in implementation and calls for a greater role of 
government agencies in different jurisdictions in training and information support for the 
banking sector. Ganguli and Ernoult (2012), after surveying a EU regime to combat WMD 
financing, concludes that financial measures can play only a limited role next to national 
export control measures due to the lack of actionable information by competent authorities. 
They further point out inadequate coordination between international agencies and national 
regulators, resulting in “highly complex, opaque and, to some extent, contradictory layers 
of regulations… making it extremely difficult for banks to effectively implement these 
measures” (Ganguli and Ernoult, 2012: 2). On the specifics of counter-proliferation financing, 
Arnold (2016: 89) notes that “most of the red-flag indicators for money laundering are not 
relevant to proliferation. Whereas money laundering usually involves hiding the source of 
illicit proceeds, proliferation financing is concerned with hiding the end-user.” The ongoing 
debates on the implementation of financial sanctions call for more integrated, harmonized 
approach between regulators in supplying actionable information and engaging the banking 
sector. Without such efforts, the implementation difficulties would certainly add to the 
passivity of a hesitant follower in the sanctioning coalition.
Fundamentally, policy coordination between states with divergent interests involves 
asymmetric strategic problems – time inconsistency and incomplete information (Fearon, 
1997; Powell, 1999). A follower member in the sanctioning coalition would worry about time 
inconsistency if the dominant sender nation later changes its course, thereby losing its current 
commercial interests in a target nation (Sechser, 2010). On the other hand, a dominant sender 
nation suffers from incomplete information problem since a follower nation could have a 
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strong incentive to free ride by hiding its commercial relations with a target nation (Shultz, 
2001). To meet these challenges, a dominant sender makes commitments by imposing ex post 
costs on itself and others in the case of future obstructions while offering a follower with ex 
ante benefits to facilitate information exchange (Kim, 2014). These standard remedies are 
two main components of ‘coercive cooperation’ – self-imposed audience costs and tactical 
issue linkage – the concepts to which we will turn shortly. In the followings, we first briefly 
describe the concept of ‘coercive cooperation’ and its main components. Second, we develop 
a sequential model of ‘coercive cooperation’ based on multi-stage Bayesian equilibrium 
under incomplete information. Lastly, we analyze the case of South Korea as a hesitant 
member in the sanctioning coalitions against Iran accordingly.
2. A ‘COERCIVE COOPERATION’ APPROACH
2.1. The Concept
Since Martin (1992), the concept of ‘coercive cooperation’, obtaining cooperation within 
a sanctioning coalition through coercion, has earned its place in the economic sanctions 
literature (Mansfield, 1994; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999; Drezner, 2000; Urpelainen, 
2010). Martin’s main contribution comes from identifying the two key factors – tactical issue 
linkage through institutions and self-imposed audience costs – that augment the ‘credibility of 
commitments’ or ‘reputation’ of a leading sender nation, thereby making the other members 
bandwagon (Lake, 1995: 349). A large body of empirical works on reputation and the role of 
these two factors in international disputes followed (Dorussen and Mo, 2001; Poast, 2012; 
Lacy and Niou, 2004; Butler, 2007; Sechser, 2010; Downs and Jones, 2011; Kurizaki and 
Whang, 2015). For example, Poast (2012: 277) confirms issue linkage’s ability to help clinch 
an agreement in alliance negotiations using matching techniques. Kurizaki and Whang (2015) 
offers empirical evidence for the existence and effectiveness of Fearon’s ‘audience costs’ in 
international disputes such as economic sanctions. However, the level of cooperation and 
the level of success of a sanction seem to be two different matters. Against conventional 
wisdom, there has been a wide range of empirical works showing the relative effectiveness of 
unilateral sanctions over multilateral ones (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; van Bergeijik, 
1994; Bonetti, 1997; Miers and Morgan, 2002). Drezner (2000: 74) traces this vexing 
problem to implementation difficulties from endemic free-riding among the sanctioning 
nations rather than bargaining problems between the primary sender and the target or among 
the sanctioning nations. Drezner (2000: 99) finds ‘an independent and significant’ role of 
international organization in reducing a free-rider problem. Moreover, from spatial models 
of voting, another important study on multilateral sanctions shows that multilateral sanctions 
often become “less effective than unilateral sanctions because the nature of coalitional 
bargaining renders it impossible to maintain consistency in the demands made of the target 
when there are more than one issue involved in a sanction” (Bapat and Morgan, 2009: 
1080). Instead of simple free-ridership in any multilateral sanctions, bargaining within a 
sanctioning coalition over the most preferred position of all members warrants a key role 
played by international institution in providing consistency to the coalition’s demands (Bapat 
and Morgan, 2009). The authors conclude “multilateral sanctions can be more effective than 
unilateral sanctions if multilateral sanctions are either unidimensional, or multidimensional 
and conducted through an international institution” (Bapat and Morgan, 2009: 1080).
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Should the involvement of international institutions be critical to a successful multilateral 
sanction, how do international institutions address two inherent problems in strategic 
cooperation between the sender state and the follower state with power asymmetry, namely 
‘time inconsistency’ and ‘incomplete information’? ‘Time inconsistency’ looms larger for 
the relatively weaker follower in a sanctioning coalition because she will be more vulnerable 
if the sender later reneges on the terms of a sanction, thereby making the follower restore 
her commercial dealings with the target later. Weaker nations are suspicious of this unequal 
vulnerability and unwilling to join the coalition (Krasner, 1985; Williams, 1993; Shadeln, 
2008). One way to entice their participation is to raise the sender’s ex post cost of reneging. 
As Fearon (1997) explains, the sender could introduce ‘tying-hand’ measures that would 
force him to incur ‘audience costs’ if he did not live up to his promises or threats. The role 
of international institutions with respect to ‘audience costs’ is straight-forward in Martin 
(1993). She assumes in her ‘countersanctions game’ that a sanction through an international 
institution is itself a ‘high-cost’ strategy because of the cost involved in gaining support of the 
institution’s members, thus resulting in higher ‘audience cost’ if the sender does not retaliate 
the follower in the case of noncompliance. She then finds an equilibrium where the sender 
imposes a high cost sanctions through an international institution and the follower complies 
when the cost of retaliation for the sender is smaller than the audience cost of no retaliation 
(Martin, 1993: 420). This configuration, however, leaves out the problem of ‘incomplete 
information’ in coalition bargaining. ‘Incomplete information’ is more of a problem for 
the sender than the follower when a sanction often requires domestic regulatory changes 
that conform to the sender’s standards such as export controls or reporting requirements in 
financial transactions. On financial regulations such as non-proliferation financing, Simmons 
(2001: 607) notes, “for a number of reasons, smaller jurisdictions tend not to want to emulate 
the tighter regulations of the dominant centres. Indeed, stringent reporting requirements in 
the U.S. may make the banking secrecy offered by the legitimate private banking industry 
even more lucrative… Because most countries do not wish to emulate U.S. policies, and 
because the externalities to the U.S. have been high, the harmonization that has taken place 
has been driven by hardball political pressure.” Thus, the follower has strong incentives to 
free ride by not actively implementing the sanctioning measures. International institutions 
not only provide information, set standards, encourage repeated interaction, but facilitate 
the provision of ex ante benefits from the follower’s cooperation though the forging of 
issue linkages (Keohane, 1984; Martin, 1993). From this perspective, a core function of 
international institutions is to reduce ‘incomplete information’ in strategic cooperation. As 
Bapat and Morgan (2009) convincingly shows, sanctions by nature involve more than one 
issue and preference ordering through issue-linkage among coalition members is the essential 
function of international institutions raising the success rate of multilateral sanctions.
Above findings suggest that international institutions provide both ex post costs and ex 
ante benefits by increasing audience costs and facilitating issue-linkages. They fall short, 
however, of adequately explaining the evolution of financial sanctions regime against 
WMD proliferation. Financial sanctions against WMD proliferation is the issue area where 
self-imposed costs through the use of ‘secondary sanctions’ have become a norm and 
international institutions provide multiple venues for tactical issue linkages. For example, 
in almost all of financial sanctions against Iran, the U.S. government has been using 
‘secondary sanctions’ to increase the level of cooperation and effectiveness. From a ‘coercive 
cooperation’ perspective, the passage of domestic legislations such as Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) with mandatory ‘secondary 
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sanctions’ clauses imposes ex post costs at home and abroad, adding to credibility of a 
leading sender nation. At the same time, financial sanctions against WMD proliferation 
take place in the intersection of international organizations as a supplier of standards and 
the national governments (and the market, of course) as an enforcer. Thus, the field is home 
to actors and venues ranging from the United Nations (UN) to the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) to the national governments. This hybrid nature of financial sanctions calls 
for better understanding on how the task of increasing ex post costs and ex ante benefits 
are divided among various actors. International institutions are notorious for its lack of 
enforcement powers. As Urpelainen (2010: 646) notes, “if states are to enforce international 
cooperation, they need to secure sufficient enforcement power while preventing abuses of 
power. If powerful states cannot commit to such constraints, weak states have every reason to 
anticipate minimal gains from cooperation, so they refuse to negotiate. Powerful states should 
deliberately reduce the supply of collective enforcement power even if this results in shallow 
cooperation.” Naturally, there needs to be more work to shed light on how to more effectively 
combine the key factors of multilateral cooperation to enhance implementation within a 
sanctioning coalition, specifying Martin’s finding of a “strong positive relationship between 
the costs of sanctions or the use of institutions and the level of cooperation observed” (Martin, 
1993: 431). We inquire how increasing ‘audience costs’ can be sequentially combined with 
‘issue linkage’ to maximize its impact on coalition members’ compliance in WMD financial 
sanctions with a model of multi-stage Bayesian equilibrium under incomplete information. 
As Martin acknowledged, her models are one-shot games of complete information and highly 
artificial (Martin, 1992: 37).
2.2. A Sequential Model of ‘Coercive Cooperation’
Repeated enforcement game
Table 1 illustrates a simple 2 x 2 enforcement game, to be called a ‘normal type’ game, 
between the Sender (S) and the Follower (F). For the sake of simplicity, the status quo payoff 
is given as (S: enforce, F: comply) = (0, 0). Under this set-up, a noncompliant F reaps the 
benefit by saving the cost of compliance c. S can also save the enforcement cost d by not 
enforcing. A noncompliant F incurs damage b to S and when enforced, will face the penalty 
a. To begin, model parameters are assumed to rank as follows: penalty (a) of noncompliance 
on F should be bigger than the damage (b) incurred on S by F’s noncompliance; S’s cost 
of enforcement (d) should be smaller than the damage (b) incurred by F’s noncompliance. 
Under this setup, when the size of F’s compliance cost (c) is bigger than the penalty of 
noncompliance (a), there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium at (Enforce, Not Comply).
When a > c, however, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Instead, one has to consider a 
mixed strategy equilibrium. S and F will choose to enforce and comply with the probabilities 
p and q that guarantee the same expected payoff for the strategies that they have available. 
A mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium leads to the probability of compliance q = (b-d)/b, 
and the probability of enforcement p = c/a. The equilibrium Nash payoff for this one-shot 
game is (0, 0) for (S, F). Extending our analysis from one-stage to multi-stage games does 
not change the outcome. Figure 1 describes a multi-stage enforcement game in stepwise 
sequence. We assume that the game ends at the first stage when both players reach the nodes 
of ①, ③, and ④. It stands to reason that the option of initial compliance irrespective of 
the outside enforcement at ① and ③ involves little incentive to weigh the value of future 
compliance against that of future noncompliance when sizable adjustment costs c in domestic 
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financial regulations have been paid already. Also, the option of initial noncompliance when 
faced with no enforcement at ④ is the best outcome from F’s perspective. A trouble for F’s 
decision-makers lies at ② where noncompliance is detected and enforced by S. F, having 
paid the penalty of noncompliance a at ②, has to weigh the value of future compliance with 
adjustment costs c against that of continued noncompliance. 
In a game of infinite iterations, F has to incorporate the subsequent equilibrium Nash 
payoffs. That is, the value of nth stage equilibrium Nash payoff has to be rolled back to the 
previous (n-1)th stage with the discount factor δ, to give us the equilibrium Nash payoff at 
the (n-1)th stage. This process of rolling-back has to continue until we reach back to ② at the 
first stage. Rolling back the discounted Nash payoff excluding sunk costs, δ (0, 0), leaves our 
first stage payoff structure unchanged. Given the unchanging payoff structure with infinite 
iterations of the game, we now revisit the first stage normal type enforcement game reflecting 
two payoff changes – introduction of institutional ‘issue-linkage’ and ‘audience costs’ (Table 
2). A reward in the form of institutional ‘issue-linkage’ provides F with the benefit x when 
F complies with the requirements of membership in an existing international institution, 
without additional costs on S as far as F voluntarily joins the international institution for 
the benefits of membership. In fact, most of international standards on non-proliferation 
financing was developed and spread from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a typical 
club organization with stringent membership and accession criteria. Once created, the 
benefits of joining an exclusive club “sufficiently alter market payoffs to non-members such 
that they want to join, even if they were better off under the status quo prior to the creating 
of a club” (Drezner, 2007: 75). When c < x, we have a pure strategy equilibrium at (Not 
Enforce, Comply) = (d, x). When c > x, a mixed strategy equilibrium with infinite iterations is 
shown in the second panel of Table 2. ‘Audience costs’ in financial sanctions against WMD 
can be captured in the threat of unilateral countersanctions such as mandatory ‘secondary 
sanctions’, and shown as yA and yB for nation S and F in the third panel of Table 2. When 
enforced, a ‘secondary sanction’ will cost a noncompliant F the ‘audience cost’ of yB. When 
not enforced, it will cost S the ‘audience cost’ of yA. The new payoff structure with ‘audience 
costs’ (a ‘threat’ hereafter) is shown in the third panel of Table 2. With infinite iterations, the 
equilibrium Nash payoffs, excluding sunk costs, stay the same for each successive stage: (0, x) 
for a ‘issue-linkage’; (0, 0) for a ‘threat’; (0, x) for a ‘issue linkage and threat’ game. Rolling 
Table 1. ‘Normal Type’ Enforcement Game
Follower (F)
Comply (q) Not Comply (1-q)
Sender (S)
Enforce (p) (0, 0) (0, -a+c)








Penalty of noncompliance on F
Damage to S of F’s noncompliance
F’s compliance cost
S’s cost of enforcement
Probability of enforcement
Probability of compliance
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back the discounted second stage Nash payoff of (0, δx) to the (Enforce, Not Comply) cell for 
a ‘issue-linkage’ game, mixed strategy equilibrium values are p= (c-x)/(a-δx) and  q=(b-d)/
d. For a ‘threat’ game, p=c/(a+yB) and q= (b-d+yA)/(b+yA). For a ‘issue-linkage and threat’ 
game, the equilibrium values are p=(c-x)/(a+yB-δx), q= (b-d+yA)/(b+yA). Then, in a game of 
infinite iterations with perfect information, compliance rate (q) will be higher with ‘audience 
cost’ (yA), whereas q remains unchanged with ‘issue-linkage’ only.
Bayesian equilibrium 
Figure 2 rearranges the rolled-back payoffs from Table 2 into a dynamic incomplete 
game. Figure 2 shows that nation F does not know whether enforcement would take place, 
but she knows whether the game being played is a ‘normal type’ or a ‘issue-linkage’ game. 
These are the signals against which F adjusts her information on S’s type - a hawk (β) with 
Figure 1. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Infinite Enforcement Game
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certain enforcement or a dove (1 - β) with no enforcement. There are four pure strategies for 
each player in this game, producing sixteen possible combinations of pure strategies: ① A 
hawk presents a ‘issue-linkage’ and a dove ‘normal type’ game; ② A hawk presents a ‘normal 
type’ and a dove ‘issue-linkage’ game; ③ S presents a ‘issue-linkage’ game regardless of its 
type; ④ S presents a ‘normal type’ game regardless of its type; 1 F complies in a ‘issue-
linkage’ but not in a ‘normal type’ game; 2 F complies in a ‘normal type’ but not in a ‘issue-
linkage’ game; 3 F complies no matter what; 4 F does not comply no matter what. Out of 
the sixteen possibilities a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the combination of strategies no 
player is willing to deviate from. Both players’ strategies can be grouped into either ‘separating 
strategies’ (①, ②; 1, 2), or ‘polling strategies’ (③, ④; 3, 4). In Figure 2, there is no 
Table 2. Enforcement Games with Perfect Information under Different Specifications
‘Normal Type’ Game 
after rolling back future payoffs
F 
Comply (q) Not Comply (1-q)
S
Enforce (p) (0, 0) (0+0, -a+c+0)
Not Enforce (1-p) (d, 0) (-b+d, c)
Mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium after rolling back  : p= c/a, q=(b-d)/b 
Equilibrium Nash payoff in every repetition excluding sunk costs : (0,0)
With institutional ‘issue-linkage’ 
after rolling back future payoffs
F
Comply (q) Not Comply (1-q)
S
Enforce (p) (0, x) (0+0, -a+c+δ x)
Not Enforce (1-p) (d, x) (-b+d, c)
Equilibrium after rolling back : p= (c-x)/(a-δx), q=(b-d)/b 
Nash payoff in every repetition excluding sunk costs: (0, x)
With a threat of countersanctions
after rolling back future payoffs
F
Comply (q) Not Comply (1-q)
S
Enforce (p) (0,0) (0+0, -a+c-yB+0)
Not Enforce (1-p) (d,0) (-b+d-yA, c)
Equilibrium after rolling back: p=c/(a+yB), q=(b-d+yA)/(b+yA) 
Nash payoff in every repetition excluding sunk costs : (0,0)
With ‘issue-linkage’ and ‘threat’ 
after rolling back future payoffs
F
Comply (q) Not Comply (1-q)
S
Enforce (p) (0, x) (0+0, -a+c-yB+δ x)
Not Enforce (1-p) (d, x) (-b+d-yA, c)
Mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium after rolling back  : p= (c-x)/(a+yB-δx),  q=(b-d+yA)/(b+yA) 
Nash payoff in every repetition excluding sunk costs : (0, x)
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perfect Bayesian equilibrium from the combinations of ‘separating strategies’. When S 
pursues the strategy ①, it is rational for F to pursue 1 since x > (-a+c+δx) and c > 0. When 
S pursues the strategy ②, it is rational for F pursue 2 since 0 > (-a+c) and c > x.
Can this be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium? No, because in the ①-1 combination, a 
dove has every incentive to switch to ‘issue-linkage’ since doing so would increase its payoff 
from (-b+d) to (d). Also in the case of ②-2, a dove can switch to a ‘normal type’ game and 
benefit by b. It is not rational to respond with pooling strategies of 3 or 4 when S is using 
separating strategies. For example, responding with 3 to ① is not rational since it is better to 
switch to noncompliance when a dove presents a ‘normal type’ game, increasing the payoff 
from 0 to c. What about ‘pooling strategies’? Since F cannot use any information about the 
type of S from the signal, it should naturally mix its strategy. Given ③, F would comply if 
the expected payoff from compliance, x(1-β)+xβ, is larger than that from noncompliance, c(1-
β)+(-a+c+δx)β. Thus, comply when β > (c-x)/(a-δx), and not comply otherwise. When the 
condition β > (c-x)/(a- δx) holds, it is rational for F to pursue 3 because by definition there 
is no possibility of a ‘normal type’ game taking place. In this case, neither a hawk nor a dove 
has an incentive to change its strategy. The combination of ③-3 is a Bayesian equilibrium. 
When the condition β < (c-x)/(a-δx) holds, F will respond with 4 and again there is no 
incentive for either party to move from this Bayesian equilibrium of ③-4 combination. 
Given ④, F would comply when β > c/a and not comply otherwise. By the same logic, the 
combination of ④-3 is a Bayesian equilibrium when β > c/a while the combination of 
④-4 is another equilibrium when β < c/a. Following the same routine for a ‘threat’ game as 
well as a ‘issue-linkage and threat’ game, we have eight Bayesian equilibrium combinations: 
S presents a ‘normal type’ game regardless of its type and F complies if β > c/a, not if β < c/a; 
S presents a ‘threat’ game regardless of its type and F complies if β > c/(a+yB), but not if β < 
c/(a+yB); S presents an ‘issue-linkage’ game regardless of its type and F complies if β > (c-x)/
(a-δx), not if β < (c-x)/(a-δx); S presents an ‘issue-linkage and threat’ game regardless of its 
Figure 2. A Dynamic Incomplete Game with ‘Normal Type’ vs. ‘Issue-Linkage’
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type and F complies if β > (c-x)/(a+yB-δx), but not if β < (c-x)/(a+yB-δx).
Figure 3 shows the overlapping ranges of compliance and non-compliance along the 
F’s perception of S. When yB has uniform distribution between 0 and x (0 < yB < x) and c 
between x and a (x < c < a), then c/(a+yB) > (c-x)/(a-δx) or yB < (a-cδ)x/(c-x) in Figure 3. 
This is because the probability of yB < (a-cδ)x/(c-x) equals (a-cδ)/(c-x). With δ converging to 
1, the probability becomes (a-c)/(c-x) whose expected value equals 1 since E(c) = (a+x)/2. 
Under this condition, all of the following inequalities hold: F will never comply under any 
circumstances within range I. Within range II, F will comply only when presented with 
‘issue-linkage and threat’. In range III, F will comply when presented with either an ‘issue-
linkage’ or ‘issue-linkage and threat’ game, but not comply otherwise. In range IV, F will 
comply unless it is presented with a ‘normal type’ game. In range V, F will comply all the 
time. In other words, when the perceived cost from a threat of additional sanctions from 
S is smaller than the perceived benefit from ‘issue-linkage’ (0 < yB < x < c < a), adding 
‘issue-linkage’ is more powerful than adding a ‘threat’ on the existing structure of a ‘normal 
type’ enforcement game, with a ‘issue-linkage and threat’ combo maximizing the Bayesian 
compliance zone. Thus, ‘issue-linkage and threat’ > ‘issue-linkage’ > ‘threat’ > ‘normal type’ 
game in the order of effectiveness. Likewise, when yB > x, adding a ‘threat’ on the existing 
structure of a ‘normal type’ enforcement game is more powerful than adding institutional 
‘issue-linkage.’1 Thus, ‘issue-linkage and threat’ > ‘threat’ > ‘issue-linkage’ > ‘normal type’ 
game in the order of effectiveness. Together, the range of Bayesian equilibrium along β 
– nation F’s perception of S’s type – clearly illustrates that unless the ‘audience costs’ in 
the form of an additional ‘threat’ is perceived to be larger than the benefits from ‘issue-
linkage’, an ‘issue-linkage’ game has better chance of inducing compliance with incomplete 
information. Furthermore, there is always an incentive to couple ‘issue-linkage’ with a 
‘threat’ since the combination will produce the largest zone of compliance. These results 
stand in sharp contrast to the mixed strategy equilibrium with complete information. A higher 
audience cost in the form of an additional threat raises the equilibrium value of compliance 
q from (b-d)/b to (b-d+yA)/(b+yA) whereas ‘issue-linkage’ benefits decrease the equilibrium 
value of enforcement rate p from c/a to (c-x)/(a-δx) with no change in compliance rate q (Table 
2). With incomplete information, however, the relative size of F’s ‘audience costs’ (yB) and 
‘issue-linkage’ benefits (x) matters and should differ in different cases. It is up to the case-
based evidence to which I turn.
1 When yB is bigger than x and has uniform distribution between x and a (x < yB < a), then c/(a+yB) 
< (c-x)/(a-δx) or yB > (a-cδ)x/(c-x). This is because the probability of yB > (a-cδ)x/(c-x) equals (ac-
2ax+cδx)/(a-x)(c-x). With δ converging to 1, the probability becomes (ac-2ax+cx)/(a-x)(c-x) whose 
expected value equals 1 since E(c) = (a+x)/2.
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3. EXPLAINING THE SOUTH KOREAN RESPONSE
3.1. International Backdrop
Figure 4 illustrates different actors and venues for standard-setting and enforcement 
in global financial sanctions regime against WMD proliferation, ranging from the United 
Nations (UN) to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to the U.S. government.
The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) derives their coercive power upon 
member states from its Charter.2 In April 2004, shortly after Dr. Abdul Khan who was in 
charge of the Pakistan’s nuclear program was caught for running a clandestine smuggling 
ring for nuclear materials, the Security Council passed the resolution 1540 establishing 
for the first time binding obligations on all member states to take and enforce effective 
measures against the proliferation of WMD. Among the measures banning proliferation of 
sensitive items to non-State actor, regulations specific to ‘the provision of funds and services 
that contribute to proliferation’ were introduced. It has since then become the obligations 
of the member states to prohibit financing of such proliferation in their domestic legal 
system. Subsequently, the Security Council established the 1540 Committee to monitor 
the national implementation of the resolution through national reporting requirements and 
expert assistance.3 The FATF is an intergovernmental organization set up by G-7 in 1989 
2 By joining the UN, member states agree to abide by the decisions made by the Security Council 
and make available ‘armed forces, assistance, and facilities’ on matters of international peace and 
security. According to the Article 48 in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, “(T)he action required to carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall 
be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may 
determine.”
3 For example, the government of South Korea (Oct. 2004, Sep. 2005) has twice reported to the 1540 
Committee their implementation reports produced up to that point. These reports are available at 
www.un.org/sc/1540/nationalreports.shtml 
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to develop and promote policy measures countering the use of the financial system by 
criminals. Beginning with 16 members, it has expanded its membership to 37 countries 
including South Korea. In the areas of money laundering and terrorist financing, the FATF 
has produced 40 recommendations so far. With respect to ‘proliferation financing’, it named 
the issue as emerging threats and has produced guidance to address the Iranian problem 
in its 2007 plenary meeting. In 2008, it published typologies and guidelines to counter 
these threats within the framework of the UNSCR 1540. More recently, the FATF issued 
in February 2013 “new mechanism to strengthen WMD and terrorist financing compliance 
in member countries” (FATF, 2013). To spread and enforce its standards, the FATF adopts 
three strategies: mutual evaluations among members; institutional partnership with other 
IGOs; ‘naming and shaming’ non-cooperative jurisdictions. It conducts on-site assessments 
on member states’ degree of implementation on its recommendations. Upon a review by all 
members, it can impose sanctions ranging from one of a lesser degree such as a warning 
letter to one at the highest level such as expulsion from the organization. It partners with the 
IMF and the World Bank through their surveillance programs such as the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) and its key component, the Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs).4 Also notable for regulating non-members is the designation 
and publication of “non-cooperative countries and jurisdictions” (NCCTs). Upon designation, 
the FATF could require its members to “condition, restrict, target, or even prohibit financial 
transactions” with NCCTs (FATF, 2013). With the threats of sanctions, 73 percent of the 
fifteen target countries so far have made their concessions prior to the implementation of any 
sanctions (Drezner, 2007). The last and the most contentious mode of enforcement comes 
from the U.S. It has exerted its superpower status to persuade or threaten other jurisdictions 
into punishing certain individuals and entities of proliferation concerns, based on U.S. 
domestic laws and regulations. For instance, the White House issued the Executive Order 
13382 in June 2005. It imposed extraterritorial jurisdiction on foreign banks, companies, 
and individuals “who provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or 
other support for, or goods or services in support of, any activities or transactions that have 
materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery” (Federal Register, 2005). Moreover, 
Title III of the Patriot Act, enacted immediately after the September 11th attacks, imposed 
“sweeping extraterritorial measures that create additional requirements for record keeping, 
specific transaction reporting, and disclosure obligations that apply to foreign banks and 
companies that do business in the U.S. or which maintain private banking or correspondent 
accounts with the U.S. financial institutions” (Alexander, 2002). The available sanctions on 
third party persons or entities are comprehensive, ranging from severing trade ties to freezing 
assets within U.S. control. In the cases of Iran and North Korea, the U.S. authorities have 
designated 184 entities and individuals based upon this Order, 42 (23%) of which are from 
third parties excluding explicit foreign subsidiaries of Iranian and North Korean origin (OFAC, 
2010). 
4 Since 2004, FATF recommendations have been included in the twelve ROSC standards. This linkage 
provided the FATF with wider reach and bigger capacity for technical assistance in non-member 
countries (IMF, 2013).
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3.2. Domestic Implementation
The South Korean regulatory system against proliferation financing came into effect 
in December 2008, one year after the enactment of the much anticipated Prohibition of 
Financing for Offences of Public Intimidation Act (PFOPIA).5 The Act for the first time 
criminalized funding terrorist or nuclear-program related activities. Although it still falls 
short of including those funds or assets not directly linked to terrorist or nuclear activities, 
its passage was crucial in landing South Korea a membership at FATF in 2009 (FATF, 
2009). Prior to PFOPIA, basic reporting requirements and intelligence functions were put 
in place in response to the UNSCR 1373. Immediately after the 9.11 attacks in 2001, the 
UNSCR 1373 mandated members to criminalize, freeze, and prohibit terrorist related funds 
or their provision. Since then, major legislative actions against proliferation financing have 
been driven by exogenous influences in South Korea, ranging from the UNSCRs to the 
FATF accession. Table 3 lists the relevant laws and their major components. Given such 
comprehensiveness of the required measures, the initial phase of implementation in South 
Korea was weak, if not symbolic. Restrictions on foreign exchange transactions for terrorist 
and WMD related entities were introduced under the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act 
and 508 transactions have been restricted in accordance with that legislation. However, due 
to the lack of explicit mechanism for designating entities involved in terrorist or proliferation 
activities, restrictions applied to only those that were designated by the UN (FATF, 2009). 
Further, despite the mandate from the UNSCR 1373 and the recommendations from the 
FATF, South Korea waited until the last minute to introduce the asset-freezing clause, 
citing the availability of confiscating authority under the Proceeds of Crime Act. Before 
the PFOPIA took effect in 2008, terrorist or proliferation financing had not been treated 
as predicate offences and broad provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act had to be applied 
for the punishments. The South Korean government did not take actions to introduce the 
provisions mandated by the UNSCR 1540 on proliferation financing.6   In its official report to 
the 1540 Committee in 2004 before the enactment of PFOPIA, the South Korean government 
simply pointed out the Financial Transaction Reports Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act as 
adequate legal sources for controlling such funds and services (UNSC, 2004). Given that 
terrorist or proliferation financing was no predicate offences before the PFOPIA, it is close 
to judiciously choosing, if not twisting, the facts on the grounds. Accordingly, the FATF in its 
mutual evaluation report of 2009 noted “the level of sanctions available for breaches of AML-
CFT (Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation) 
obligations is low and sanctions are not often applied by supervisory authorities” (FATF, 
2009). More often than not, joining this exclusive club is regarded as a stamp of approval 
that testifies to the transparency of the domestic financial system, thereby inducing non-
members to adopt the standards to enhance their standing in the financial community and 
5 The initial draft of counter-terrorism bill was introduced and discarded in May 2004 after the term of 
16th National Assembly came to an end. The main obstacle to the progress of the draft was the debate 
over the expanded role of National Intelligence Service. NGOs strongly voiced their concerns over 
the potential breach of civil rights (The Chosun Daily, 2004).
6 The Resolution “decides that all States shall…establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate 
effective national controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment 
such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation”
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offer their financial firms better access to the international market (Drezner, 2007; Mattli and 
Buthe, 2003). The FATF combines these presumed benefits with the institutional surveillance 
to spread its stringent standards devised among a cohesive group of developed countries. 
Faced with the criticism before its membership accession, the South Korean government 
promised to amend the existing laws in line with the FATF protocols and did introduce the 
‘asset freezing’ clause in PFOPIA in 2011.7 Furthermore, since 2004 the IMF in conjunction 
with the FATF has made AML-CFT an integral part of its Article IV surveillance on member 
nations.8 In so doing, the IMF raised the stake of the enforcement activities and at the same 
time strengthened the compliant members’ standing in IMF surveillance program. Together, 
the presumed benefits from joining the exclusive FATF provided the rationale and momentum 
for the passage and enactment of PFOPIA. It is no coincidence that PFOPIA was enacted in 
time for the FATF on-site surveillance. It offered ex ante benefits that addressed incomplete 
information problem. 
The passage of PFOPIA and its amendments around the accession to FATF have put in 
place the financial regulations against WMD in line with international standards. However, 
joining a coalition is one thing and actively implementing a sanction is another (Drezner, 
2000; Ouagrham-Gourmley, 2012; Ganguli and Ernoult, 2012). In this light, the case of 
7 Prohibition of Financing for Offences of Public Intimidation Act (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/)
8 It provides “a framework  to deal with cases where money laundering, terrorist financing, and related 
crimes are so serious as to threaten domestic stability, balance of payments stability, and the effective 
operation of the international monetary system” (IMF, 2012).
Table 3. A Legislative Chronology on Counter-Proliferation Financing (South Korea)




Terrorism after the 
9.11 Attacks)
Financial Transaction Reports Act
(Enacted, 2001)
Obligation to file suspicious transaction 
reports over KRW 20 million
Korea Financial Intelligence Unit 
(Established, 2001)
The lead agency for anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing
Foreign Exchange Transactions Act 
(Amended, 2001)
Restriction on transactions by or with 
non-residents designated by the UNSCRs
UNSCR 1540, 
2004 Foreign Trade Act (Amended, 2006) Establishment of export control regime
FATF Accession, 
2009
Prohibition of Financing for Offences 
of Public Intimidation Act  
(Enacted, 2007)
Introduction of punishments on terrorist 
and WMD related financing schemes
Financial Transaction Reports Act
 (Amended, 2007)
Inclusion of terrorist and WMD related 
matters to suspicious transaction reports
Financial Transaction Reports Act 
 (Amended, 2010)
Obligation to file suspicious transaction 
reports over KRW 5 million
Prohibition of Financing for Offences 
of Public Intimidation Act  
(Amended, 2011)
Introduction of ‘asset freezing’ clause for 
individuals or institutions suspected of 
terrorist or proliferation activities.
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South Korea’s passive attitude regarding non-proliferation financing was turned upside 
down around the Bank Mellat fiasco in 2010 when ‘secondary sanctions’ from the U.S. 
became a real possibility. As Table 4 shows, the trouble started with the latest UN sanctions 
on Iran’s nuclear program in June 2010. The UNSCR 1929 imposed further restrictions on 
Iran’s financing its alleged nuclear program, on top of the long standing list of sanctions 
already in place.9 In its Annex, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat in Malaysia was designated for 
its involvement in proliferation and the Bank’s role in facilitating funds for Iranian nuclear 
entities was noted. Bank Mellat has been running its only Asian office in Seoul since 2001. 
Although the U.S. Treasury added Bank Mellat to the Specially Designated National (SDN) 
list upon Executive Order 13382 in 2005 and kept warning the South Korean government on 
the Bank’s ties to Iranian nuclear programs, the South Korean government found comfort in 
the fact that the Bank’s Seoul branch was not on the list of UNSCR 1929.10 Soon thereafter 
in July, however, the U.S. Congress ratcheted up its pressure against Iran by passing the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). 
The Act expands many existing restrictions and includes new provisions designed to 
reach foreign firms currently doing business with Iran. As with Executive Order 13382, 
it threatens to sanction foreign banks doing business with the designated Iranian banks. 
It effectively increased ex post costs on the financial institutions in the U.S. and follower 
nations. Moreover, the implementing regulations of CISADA sanctioned Bank Mellat Seoul 
in October and demanded its shutdown to the South Korean government. Given the potential 
for damages affecting South Korean banks and companies doing business with the Bank, the 
South Korean government decided to impose its own sanctions on Iran and suspended Bank 
Mellat Seoul branch on 8th of September. Under the new sanctions, 126 Iranian individuals 
and companies were banned from exchange transactions with South Korea. They also 
prohibit building contracts and new investment in Iran, as well as the provision of technical 
and financial services that would benefit Iran’s energy sector (King and Spalding, 2010). 
The sequence of actions leading up to the Bank Mellat Fiasco in 2010 is clearly in sync with 
the Bayesian equilibrium model developed in Figure 2. First, the structure of a dynamic 
incomplete information game with infinite iterations is adequate for explaining the sender-
follower relationship in South Korea’s joining the financial sanctions against Iran. A hesitant 
follower like South Korea would weigh the value of future gains against costs from joining 
the bandwagon without knowing for sure the degree of determination of the sender. Unless 
South Korea has a strong belief in the sender being a hawk, as in the range V in Figure 3, 
she would not comply in a ‘normal type’ enforcement game against the sender. As noted, the 
South Korean government introduced counter-proliferation financing measures required by 
the successive UNSCRs only to fall short of active implementation thereof. Second, a sender 
offers a potential reward from adopting counter-proliferation financing measures in the 
form of institutional ‘issue-linkage’ - a FATF membership and the IMF inclusion of AML-
CFT in its surveillance for South Korea. A hesitant South Korea reads this signal and in turn 
adjusts its belief of the sender’s type β, more likely to be a hawk by the size of III and IV, 
and chooses compliance as its equilibrium strategy. The passage of the single most important 
legislation in this area, PFOPIA, right before the FATF accession in 2009 clearly testifies to 
9 Since 2006, there have been seven separate resolutions – 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 
1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1887 (2009), 1929 (2010) – from the Security Council on Iran’s nuclear 
program.
10 From interviews with Foreign Ministry officers of South Korea.
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that effect.
Third, a credible threat of additional sanctions from the sender would further increase 
the perceived likelihood of a hawkish behavior from the sender, the sum of II, III, IV and V. 
As a result, South Korea is more likely than under any other specifications above to choose 
compliance as its equilibrium strategy. In fact, despite this institutional ‘issue-linkage’, it 
was not until the passage of CISADA and when the U.S. banged its door that the South 
Korean government started actively implementing what was already in the books (Table 4). 
The Financial Supervisory Service of South Korea, its regulatory agency, cited the illegal 
transactions between Bank Mellat Seoul and Bank Saderat, UNSCR designated entity, as the 
reasons for suspending its operations (Donga Daily, Sep. 28, 2010). It is noteworthy that the 
U.S. threat of secondary sanctions through CISADA was only heard in South Korea after 
she joined the FATF and had PFOFIA in place. A series of on-going U.S. financial sanctions 
against third party collaborators to Iran’s nuclear ambition does not seem to have affected 
the South Korea’s perception of the sender’s type β. As shown in Figure 3, as far as the cost 
of additional sanction yB is perceived to be smaller than the potential benefit from issue-
linkage x, F is less likely to choose compliance strategy when faced with a ‘threat’ game 
than with an ‘issue-linkage’ game given incomplete information about the sender type β. 
Between traditional allies such as the U.S. and South Korea, this is more than likely given 
the inherent political discretions involved in actual implementation of secondary sanctions. 
Moreover, South Korea imported about 10% of their entire crude oil needs from Iran and 
had the biggest share of home electronics market in Iran (Wu and Morrison, 2007). Relying 
exclusively on the existing UNSCR designation process to sanction any Iran-related entities 
or individuals, South Korea found refuge in the mandatory nature of such actions with 
respect to the diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran. Given that UNSCR designation 
process is cumbersome and time consuming, it would raise the cost of enforcement (d) in a 
‘normal type’ game only to reduce F’s (in this case South Korea’s) compliance rate q = (b-
d)/b (Table 2). On the other hand, F will have every incentive to accept an ‘issue-linkage’ 
Table 4. The Bank Mellat Fiasco (2010)
UNSCR 1929
(June, 2010)
- “First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of 
Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has facilitated hundreds 
of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile, and defense 
entities” (Annex I).
US enactment of 
CISADA
(July, 2010)
- ‘The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
2010’ (CISADA) severely constrains U.S. banks from engaging in financial 
transactions with foreign banks doing business with designated Iranian banks. 
- Bank Mellat was designated in 2008 by the U.S. Treasury for its linkage to 




- U.S. notified South Korea that Bank Mellat Seoul branch has been facilitating 
financial transactions for Iranian nuclear programs and demanded its shutdown. 
- Robert Einhorn, Obama’s Special Advisor for Non-proliferation and Arms 




- South Korea issued a two-month suspension on Bank Mellat Seoul branch and 
banned financial transactions on 102 Iranian entities and 24 individuals. 
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offer as the equilibrium Nash payoff from doing so is larger than a ‘normal type’ enforcement 
game by the size of x (Table 2). Without a doubt, S will witness more of F’s compliance if it 
were to present ‘issue-linkage’ and a ‘threat’ simultaneously. However, it is unlikely that this 
is a feasible option in actual cases since ‘issue-linkage’ (FATF) and a ‘threat’ (U.S. Congress) 
originate from two different sources  and the FATF has hardly exercised its ‘naming and 
shaming’ strategy against its own member jurisdictions (IMF, 2013).
4. CONCLUSION
This paper applies a Bayesian equilibrium model to address the sequencing of the two 
main factors that contribute to ‘coercive cooperation’ by showing how to combine ‘issue-
linkage’ and ‘audience costs’ in order to maximize purported cooperative effect. Unlike the 
game of complete information where a follower would increase its equilibrium compliance 
rate with larger ‘audience costs’ in the form of a ‘threat’, it is more likely in a game of 
incomplete information to show higher compliance by accepting ‘issue-linkage’ than a ‘threat’ 
when the perceived cost from the threat is smaller than the presumed benefit from ‘issue-
linkage’. A leading sender in a sanctioning coalition will then have a strong incentive to add 
a ‘threat’ to bring about the maximum compliance from the follower. However, starting with 
a bigger stick will increase the expected compliance rate from the follower and subsequently 
reduce the enforcement rate in equilibrium, thereby leaving the Nash payoffs unchanged 
for both players. Our model’s predictions have been borne out by the case study on South 
Korea. In response to WMD financial sanctions against Iran, the government of South Korea 
accepted institutional issue-linkages, voluntary accession to the FATF in the case of Iran 
sanctions. Soon thereafter, the U.S. passed new legislations with strong ‘secondary sanctions’ 
clauses, a credible ‘threat’ with the self-imposed ‘audience costs’. Once in a bandwagon 
through tactical issue-linkages, the government of South Korea actively implemented 
enforcement measures, the suspension of the Iranian Mellat Bank in Seoul. For a leading 
sender like the U.S., the strategic benefits from institutional ‘issue-linkage’ do not stop with 
higher cooperation and enforcement. South Korea was among the among the first 12 donors 
collectively providing $27.3 million to strengthen the AML-CFT(Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation) regimes in ‘Topical Trust Fund’ 
of the IMF.11
Although the evolution of South Korea’s nonproliferation financing regime and its 
sudden change of course in implementation provides partial evidence for the validity of 
the model, one case study can hardly prove it. To do so, one needs to test the hypotheses 
derived from the model with sanctions database with a larger number of noncompliance 
episodes. Notwithstanding this important shortcoming, this paper examines the ‘black box’ 
of sender dynamics in a different light from the previous studies. It builds on the existing 
works on the role of international institutions in sanctioning coalitions and tackles the two 
perennial themes in coercive cooperation, ‘time inconsistency’ and ‘incomplete information’, 
separately, instead of lumping them together.
11 In April 2009, the IMF launched its first, donor-supported ‘Topical Trust Fund’ in the area of AML-
CFT. Switzerland, Norway, the UK, Canada, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Korea, and France comprise the entire list of donors that started the first ‘Topical Trust 
Fund’ of its kind in the area of AML/CFT. 
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